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To the reader: This paper is part of a broader project on new modes of governance under the 
6th Framework program (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392). Its place within this project is 
to focus on scope conditions for soft, non-hierarchical modes of steering, and arguing in par-
ticular. Comments are most welcome. 
 INTRODUCTION 
Arguing, understood as reason-giving, is all pervasive in international politics: Negotiating 
actors give reasons for their demands at almost any time, regardless of whether talks are con-
ducted in public or behind closed doors. And yet, since negotiations have most often been 
conceived of as processes of bargaining in which actors seek to adjust their behavior through 
the exchange of threats and incentives, arguments have primarily been treated as rather 
epiphenomenal to strategic interaction. In this paper we argue that under certain circum-
stances arguments affect negotiating actors’ preferences, and subsequently lead to outcomes 
that are not easily explained in pure bargaining terms. Arguing and bargaining as different 
modes of interaction, however, are not contending but rather complementing explanations. As 
a result, we have to ask which scope conditions are particularly conducive to enabling arguing 
to prevail in decentralized negotiations and, thus, to affect both process and outcome. In a 
structured-focused comparison of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) with the European 
Convention we aim to unveil institutional factors that induce actors to take validity claims 
into account and change their preferences accordingly. At the example of negotiations on sim-
plification and the single legal personality of the European Union we seek to demonstrate that 
the transparency of the debate in conjunction with a higher degree of uncertainty about appro-
priate behavior made arguing in the Convention particularly effective.  
 
Brief overview of the debate: Where it started, where it went, and where it is now 
Emanating from a controversy in the German International Relations quarterly Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Beziehungen,
1 the last decade witnessed an intensive debate on the role of ar-
guing versus bargaining in multilateral negotiations. Several deficiencies of bargaining theory 
triggered the debate: First, arguing in the sense of reason-giving is all pervasive in public as 
well as private setting. However, if we conceive of negotiations narrowly as processes of pol-
icy adjustments through the exchange of threats and incentives, the use of arguments is ren-
dered superfluous and therefore in need of explanation. Second, bargaining theories are inher-
ently contradictory: Since problems of collective actions almost always have multiple solu-
tions that entail different distributive consequences for the parties involved, negotiating par-
ties have incentives to withhold or exaggerate information about their preferences. And since 
they have to fear that other actors are behaving likewise, knowing that they know that they 
have incentives to distort information on preferences etc, the exchange of credible threats and 
                                                 
1 (Müller 1994, 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Zangl and Zürn 1996; Schneider 1994; Keck 1995) 
  2incentives, and, thus, an agreement is difficult, if not impossible to achieve among instrumen-
tal actors (Morrow 1994; Fearon 1998; Müller 2004). Third, processes of collective decisions 
often result in surprises, that is, in outcomes that could not be expected on the basis of the 
interests represented. Oftentimes the parties agree on creative solutions to the problem under 
discussion. They come up with rules and norms that suggest that some of them might have 
changed their preferences endogenously to the negotiation, and that the rationalist premise of 
exogenously given preferences stands on shaky grounds accordingly.  
 
Informed by the Habermasian concept of communicative action, it was suggested that in cases 
of ill-defined situations where actors are uncertain about their appropriate behavior, they en-
gage in seeking “a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well 
as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action“ (Risse 2000: 7). In this 
case, actors are prepared to be persuaded by better arguments, and relationships of power con-
sequently recede in the background. Thus, the eventual rule is not a compromise between di-
verse interests, but rather reflects a reasoned consensus with which actors comply due to their 
insight in its legitimacy. Because it aims at achieving a reasoned consensus, this process is 
goal-oriented on the one hand. On the other hand, however, it endogenizes preferences over 
ends as well as derived preferences over the best means to arrive at those ends.
2 . 
 
On the empirical ground 
How do arguments affect actors’ persuasions, and how can we observe this process empiri-
cally? In a first approach to this question, we started looking at the properties of arguing 
speech acts, and distinguished analytically between arguing and bargaining as communicative 
modes
3. In the ideal-typical communicative mode arguing, actors assess arguing speech acts 
on the basis of an external authority (Berufungsgrundlagen) they refer to. Hence, arguing is 
triadic in structural respect. In bargaining, in contrast, it is merely information about the 
speaker’s preferences and bargaining power that makes threats and incentives credible. Thus, 
bargaining features a dyadic structure (Ulbert et al. 2004). Empirically, however, arguing and 
bargaining as modes of interaction do not coincide with communicative modes. Communica-
tion never takes on these ideal-typical forms, and arguing and bargaining speech acts usually 
go together in reality (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005). Hence, when the quantitative distribution 
                                                 
2 Also termed preferences over outcomes versus preferences over strategies. On this distinction see Elster 
(1998b: 7). 
3 (Elster 1998b; Saretzki 1996). For this distinction see in greater detail (Risse 2004: 296-298) 
  3of arguing speech acts does not affect their effectiveness, we need to deduce other observable 
implications that would lend credence to the expectation that arguing indeed induced an actor 
to take validity claims into account and change her preferences accordingly. One such impli-
cation is that effective arguing should lead to a particular type of outcome that is in many 
ways distinguishable from outcomes of processes of pure bargaining.
4 Whereas pure bargain-
ing can be expected to result in compromises, pure arguing should bring about a reasoned 
consensus that aims at solving the problem under discussion. In other words, the effectiveness 
of arguing should be observable indirectly on the basis of an outcome that approaches a rea-
soned consensus. Such a reasoned consensus can be detected when the result of a negotiation 
is surprising, i.e. a priori not expected on the basis of represented preferences and bargaining 
power; when we can rule out exogenous preference changes; and, above all, when actors give 
the same reasons for its achievement (Risse 2004: 301). Furthermore, a long shadow of the 
future can raise the transaction costs associated with bargaining as it gives further incentives 
to bargain even harder and to delay an agreement (Fearon 1998: 270). This deadlock is often 
only broken through package-deals that are usually a matter of last minute compromises be-
tween authorized actors (Scharpf 1997: 130). Thus, a surprisingly early agreement further 
hints to the effectiveness of arguing. Finally, since in processes of arguing asymmetric power 
should matter less than in pure bargaining, a disproportionately strong influence of materially 
weak actors would also suggest a reasoned consensus. 
Operationalization of the Dependent Variable “reasoned consensus” 
-  actors give same reasons for its achievement 
-  agreement is surprising, often “problem-solving” character above the lowest com-
mon denominator 
-  early agreement 
-  influence of “weak” actors 
 
The above described empirical challenges led to a reformulation of the research question that 
originally triggered the debate. When it is impossible to observe processes of arguing directly, 
and yet their importance for negotiation outcomes is staring us in the face, concentrating on 
the scope conditions for the attainment of reasoned consensuses becomes essential. We there-
fore arrive at our previously outlined research question and ask, which institutional scope 
conditions are particularly conducive to enabling arguing to prevail in multilateral negotiat-
ing systems and, thus, to affect both process and outcome? In so doing, we relax social action 
theoretic qualifications, and set aside the question of the motivation of actors engaged in argu-
                                                 
4 To be sure, both interaction modes need not result in a settlement. Negotiations break down or sometimes lead 
to an informed agreement of disagree. 
  4ing.
5 In other words, the theoretically important question is how the deliberative setting can 
shape processes and outcomes independently of the motives of the participants.
6  
 
Methodological Approach 
The particular difficulty in studying negotiations lies in the low availability of primary data on 
actors’ “true” preferences on the one hand, and the idiosyncrasies of negotiations in dealing 
with different issues and in different negotiation settings on the other hand. Large- or Me-
dium-N-studies are therefore unfeasible for our specific research question. But considering 
preferences as fix and inferring them ex post from negotiation outcomes cannot be the solu-
tion to the problem. We try to address this problem by multiplying the number of observations 
through generating several observable implications to which we have to pay particular atten-
tion in tracing the process.  
Nonetheless, it is a stroke of luck for students of arguing that the European Union provided us 
what we might well call a natural experiment: After a decade of onerous and disappointing 
negotiations in a series of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC), the Heads of State and Gov-
ernments of the European Union sought to break the deadlock on institutional questions by 
conducting talks in a completely new setting: the European Convention. Even though the 
(same) government representatives were present in both settings, and could have always ve-
toed the final outcome, the Convention did in many regards achieve a surprising outcome, and 
broke the deadlock on many issues where preferences were originally regarded intense and 
stable. Despite their many similarities, however, the Convention differs in important ways 
from IGCs as this institutional setting varies exactly those factors that proponents of arguing 
have suggested being particularly conducive to its effectiveness: It encompasses a larger 
number and a greater variety of actors (with probable implications for uncertainty and the 
emergence of leadership), and it is more transparent than negotiations in IGCs. In other 
words, the Convention allows us to increase the homogeneity of our units, IGCs and the Con-
vention, by keeping important alternative variables constant while varying many of the scope 
conditions under study.  
 
                                                 
5 (Risse 2002a: 603; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005: 176) 
6 (Elster 1998a: 104). In this regard our endeavor is similar to that of the literature on the rational design of insti-
tutions, which, however, ignores asking for the role of reason-giving at all (Koremenos et al. 2001).  
  5In this paper we focus on the differences between the Convention and IGCs by comparing 
negotiations on the Single Legal Personality of the European Union. The question of merging 
the legal personalities of the different European Communities into one single entity based on 
one single treaty
7 had occupied European decision-makers since the IGC on Political Union 
in 1991-92. As the question of single legal personality was intrinsically tied to the issue of 
treaty simplification, it generally caused controversies on multiple dimensions: Apart from 
uncertainties about the particular legal effects of such a merger, and concerns about ratifica-
tion problems, it further broached the age-old question of the European Union’s constitutional 
nature. Therefore, the main cleavages ran across integrationist countries arguing for a unified 
approach, and intergovernmentalist countries preferring to keep entities and treaties clearly 
separated. While this question had particularly but unsuccessfully been dealt with at the 1996-
97 IGC in Amsterdam, this was the very first issue the Convention agreed on in late 2002. To 
the great surprise of the parties involved, the Convention’s Working Groups on Legal Person-
ality recommended merging the legal personalities and subsequently agreed on a far-reaching 
simplification where the treaties and the “pillars” would be collapsed into one single frame-
work of the European Union. 
 
 
Triggers and Institutional Scope Conditions 
On the basis of the Habermasian ideal speech situation, and procedural conceptions of delib-
erative democracy, explorative studies on arguing and persuasion in multilateral negotiations 
have studied several possible triggers for the prevalence of arguing in negotiations (Ulbert et 
al. 2004; Ulbert and Risse 2005). In order to explore how an institutional setting affects the 
effectiveness of arguing, we need to study how it weakens or strengthens these factors. Let us 
consider each in turn. 
 
First, different types of uncertainty can be expected to be conducive to effective arguing. Un-
certainty has many faces, however: First, uncertainty about other actors’ behavior arises from 
                                                 
7 That is, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951), the Treaty establish-
ing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (1957). IGCs culminated in the Single European Act (SEA, 1986), the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1992), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000), which inter alia form the patchwork of the European Union’s pri-
mary law. Whereas the negotiations of the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht primarily dealt with the policy 
scope of the EC/EU and paved the way for the single market and monetary union, the Amsterdam and Nice IGCs 
focused mainly on the EU’s constitutional character. 
  6imperfect information about the actions taken by others. Second, uncertainty can also refer to 
incomplete information about other actors’ preferences – a problem that is difficult to solve 
when cooperation entails distributive consequences as actors have incentives to withhold pri-
vate information. Third, actors may be uncertain about future states of the world. In contrast 
to the first two types where actors hold private information, in this case all actors lack infor-
mation about cause-effect relationships, and, thus, about possible consequences of coopera-
tion (Koremenos et al. 2001 778-779).
8 Fourth, in situations where different roles apply, ac-
tors may face another state of uncertainty about their appropriate behavior in an ill-defined 
situation. Particularly in these last two cases can we expect actors to deliberate cause-effect 
relationships on the one hand, and appropriate and normatively justifiable behavior on the 
other hand (Risse 2000: 19; Risse 2004: 294).  
How does variation in the institutional setting affect the prevalence of arguing? Uncertainty 
about future states of the world is first and foremost a property of the issue-area in question, 
and does not vary with the institutional setting.
9 In consequence, IGCs and the Convention 
will not differ with regard to the effectiveness of arguing. Uncertainty about other actor’s 
preferences as well as about appropriate behavior, in contrast, should vary with the negotia-
tion setting and with its composition in particular. While IGCs primarily encompass govern-
mental representatives and some delegates from supranational institutions, the European Con-
vention is composed of four components, namely representatives of the governments, the 
European Parliament, the National Parliaments and the European Commission. What makes 
this feature of the Convention particularly interesting is that institutional identities over-
lapped. A Member of the European Parliament, for instance, is a member of this particular 
European institution, a member of a European political group and a national party, as well as 
a citizen of her Member States at the same time. In consequence, some actors might become 
uncertain about their appropriate behavior on the one hand. On the other hand, their counter-
parts can never be sure about these actor’s preferences.  
This was well understood by the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard 
D’Estaing. In order to avoid a rigidification of the Convention along national lines, the Con-
                                                 
8 A commonly made distinction is often made between regulatory and distributive issues, and sometimes be-
tween problems of coordination and cooperation. These distinctions are not very useful as almost every regula-
tory issue as well as problems of coordination may have distributive consequences. It is thus more accurate to 
distinguish between the severity of the distribution problems as well as the uncertainty about distributive effects. 
9 If cause-effect relationships are not well established, and the consequences of cooperation are less clear, we 
would expect states to seek third actors’ advice and to open negotiations to policy experts and the like. This in 
turn clears the way for epistemic communities to substantively influence policy outcomes (Haas 1995). 
  7ventioneers were seated in alphabetical order instead of components.
10 Another procedural 
device the Chairman used was the decision-rule: While most multilateral negotiations are 
usually concluded by establishing a consensus, which is generally defined as the absence of 
disagreement, consensus in the context of the Convention meant the absence of significant 
disagreement. The exact threshold for a disagreement to be perceived as significant was, how-
ever, left open – and deliberately so. A single Conventioneer could therefore never be sure 
whether or not he was part of a significant majority or minority opinion, and was therefore 
forced to reveal her preferences and to form coalitions. These aspects where furthered by Gis-
card special emphasis on the Conventioneers’ individuality.
11
Hypothesis 1: Overlapping identities increase uncertainty about appropriate behaviour and 
other actors’ preferences and, thus, the likelihood of a prevalence of arguing.  
Observable implications 
-  Different “cross-cutting” meetings prior and during the deliberation. 
-  Actors refer to interests of other components 
Second, it is suggested that arguing in a public sphere affects the process and outcome of ne-
gotiations. According to Jon Elster, arguing in front of an audience has to be in line with con-
straints like imperfection, consistency and plausibility.
12 In other words, powerful social 
norms on procedures are constraining in that actors are, first, forced to act in a way that she is 
not perceived as selfish, but as impartial and credible. Second, in order to remain credible, 
speakers have to follow a coherent line of reasoning. Third, and related, their validity claims 
have to be plausible and maintain verification. The less certain actors are about which course 
the negotiation is likely to follow, the more would we expect these norms to affect their de-
rived preferences (Elster 1998a: 104). Further, these constraining effects should increase the 
                                                 
10 On Giscard’s leadership see (Kleine 2007). 
11 For instance when he snubbed the Commission alternate Paolo Ponzano: “Je voudrais juste rappeler un point 
d'éthique de la Convention, Monsieur Ponzano. Il ne s'agit pas d'une négociation entre les Institutions, le Parle-
ment européen et les gouvernements. Chacun parle en son nom. Par exemple, en ce qui concerne les membres de 
la Commission, on sait qu'ils sont membres de la Commission lorsque Monsieur Barnier ou Monsieur Vitorino 
s'expriment. Mais ils n'expriment pas le point de vue de la Commission. La Commission s'exprime par des ca-
naux appropriés en tant que telle. Nous sommes ici à une réunion de Conventionnels où chacun s'exprime en son 
nom comme va le faire à l'instant Monsieur Fischer“ (cited in Magnette 2003). 
12 That is, the speaker should show some impartiality and refer to the alleged common good. In addition, the 
arguments should be consistent in that they follow a coherent line of reasoning. Furthermore, the validity claims 
must be plausible and have to maintain verification. 
  8more the consent of this audience is required.
13 Theses factor varies with the overall transpar-
ency of the debate.  
In contrast to IGCs where documents are usually not accessible for the public and negotia-
tions are conducted behind closed doors, the Convention published every single document 
that was related to the deliberations, and also its discussions were open to the public. In other 
words, there was a permanent feeling of transparency within the Convention. Thus, and in 
combination with the higher degree of uncertainty about appropriate behavior in the Conven-
tion, we would expect the above mentioned procedural norms to affect behavior and prefer-
ences within the Convention to a considerable higher degree than in an IGC. 
Hypothesis 2: A transparent negotiation setting is conducive to the prevalence of arguing.  
Observable Implications 
-  In contrast to IGCs where actors are better able to switch between different lines of 
reasoning, we would expect Conventioneers to advance one coherent line of reason-
ing.  
-  If actors change their line of reasoning in a transparent setting, we would expect them 
to explicitly address this as a genuine preference change. 
With reference to the Habermasian concept of a common lifeworld (Habermas 1981: 2: 209), 
a regularly voiced argument is that the density of institutional setting can make a difference as 
it provides the “external authority” that is required to enable the triadic structure of arguing to 
come into play. Yet, a common lifeworld is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the 
effectiveness of arguing (Müller 2004: 402). First, negotiating actors often construct their own 
common lifeworld, be it the common membership in an institution or analogies to previous 
encounters. Second, densely institutionalized settings may entail diverse and even contradic-
tory arguments, analogies and frames, of which some are being used in the debate while oth-
ers meet with no response. Thus, in order to establish a third angle in processes of arguing, 
norms have to be activated first (Ulbert and Risse 2005: 354). 
This opens the way for individual or institutional actors to influence negotiation processes and 
outcomes. In that regard, studies on norm entrepreneurs or epistemic communities have come 
                                                 
13 In contrast to Elster, Jeffrey Checkel argues that negotiations in front of a public audience result in ritualistic 
rhetoric, and that deliberation behind closed doors is more effective in terms of preference changes. Both claims 
are not self-excluding, but heavily dependent on the kind of audience and its required consent. Elster refers to 
procedural norms of an otherwise neutral audience, whereas Checkel (2001: 54; 2003: 222) alludes to attentive 
domestic audiences that expect its negotiators to pursue national interests. 
  9up with a long list of factors that influence these actors’ influence.
14 With regard to arguing 
and persuasion, however, we focus more particular on the trustworthiness of a speaker and her 
authority. As argued above, rationalist studies that perceive of negotiating actors as instru-
mental remain unconvincing with regard to the exchange of information in strategic interac-
tion. Trust, broadly defined as the subjective confidence in the expectation of not being ex-
ploited by the other side, may alleviate this problem as it affects the persuadee’s readiness for 
assessing other’s validity claims. Also, highly authoritative members of “in-groups” can be 
regarded as better able to activate norms as a common frame of reference, and to persuade 
other of a particular argument (Johnston 2001: 496-499). The crucial point here, however, is 
that these aspects, trustworthiness and authority, are not a matter of fact but should vary with 
the institutional context. First, centralized settings that pool tasks (NB: Not control!)
15 estab-
lish authorities, whereas decentralized settings rather disperse authority. IGCs feature a low 
level of centralization: It is the Presidency of the Council that is granted a small degree of 
authority. In the Convention, in contrast, the Chairman, the triumvirate, and the Praesidium 
assumed a great degree of authority within the Convention as well as the individual Working 
Groups.  
Hypothesis 3: The more centralized the negotiation setting, the more trustworthy leadership is 
conducive to the prevalence of arguing.  
Observable Implications 
-  Centralized negotiating setting 
-  Single individual or institutional actors assume a prominent role in the negotiation. 
-  Their occurrence constitutes a “turning point”. 
-  They are described as trustworthy or authorities. 
 
                                                 
14 Informed by the social psychologist literature on cognitive consistency, Cornelia Ulbert argues that arguments 
that resonate with individual beliefs and/or already agreed-upon principles and norms can be easier accommo-
dated and adapted (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897; Ulbert 1997). See also the literature on framing, e.g. (Rein 
and Schön 1991; Kohler-Koch 2000). On leadership in general see (Young 1991; Moravcsik 1999; Tallberg 
2006). For a sociological/constructivist point of view see inter alia (Johnston 2001) and (Müller 2004). On 
transnational actors see (Risse 2002b). 
15 Centralization is not to be confounded with control (Koremenos et al. 2001: 772). The first refers to a centrali-
zation of tasks whereas the latter relates to a centralization of formal power, which should be detrimental to 
processes of arguing. 
  10Table: Hypotheses and Observable Implications 
Convention IGC 
Hypothesis 1: Overlapping identities increase uncertainty about appropriate behaviour and other actors’ pref-
erences and, thus, the likelihood of a prevalence of arguing. 
 
-  Cross-cutting cleavages. “Mixed” meetings 
prior and during the deliberation. 
-  Actors refer to interests of other components. 
 
-  Clear and rigid instead of cross-cutting 
cleavages. 
-  Actors refer to the interests of their compo-
nents solely. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A transparent negotiation setting is conducive to the prevalence of arguing. 
 
-  Conventioneers advance one coherent line of 
reasoning. 
-  If actors change their line of reasoning in a 
transparent setting, we would expect them to 
explicitly address this as a genuine prefer-
ence change. 
 
 
-  Actors advance several lines of reasoning at 
the same time. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The more centralized the negotiation setting, the more trustworthy leadership is conducive to the 
prevalence of arguing 
 
-  Centralized negotiating setting 
-  Single individual or institutional actors as-
sume a prominent role in the negotiation. 
-  Their occurrence constitutes a “turning 
point”. 
-  They are described as trustworthy or authori-
ties. 
 
 
-  Decentralized negotiating setting 
-  Single individual or institutional actors do 
not assume a prominent role in the negotia-
tion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY: SINGLE LEGAL PERSONALITY 
This chapter compares the negotiation processes on simplification and the single legal person-
ality within the 1996-7 IGC and the European Convention. We begin, however, with a short 
primer on simplification and its legal and political intricacies. 
 
Different Settings, different outcomes 
In order to illustrate the rather complex structure of its unique legal order, textbooks on the 
EU often make use of the so-called “temple model.”
16 This wording implies an overarching 
role of the EU (as the roof of the temple) in relation to its three pillars: the European Commu-
                                                 
16 The model draws on Art. 1 para 3 Treaty on European Union that states that the “Union shall be founded on 
the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty.” 
  11nity and the two intergovernmental policies outside the Community. From a legal point of 
view, however, this is not quite correct. Although “European Union” is commonly used as an 
all-encompassing term to refer to the actions of the “single institutional framework” (ToM 
Article C), the Union as such was never explicitly conferred legal personality. The EU’s 
status under international law and its relationship to the EC – in short: the very legal nature of 
the EU – is therefore unsettled at worst, and complex at best.
17 What appears to be a curious 
intricacy at first is in fact the legacy of the 1990-91 IGC on Political Union in Maastricht and 
a compromise between two very different approaches to European integration. At that time 
the then Twelve where divided on the question whether or not to integrate new policies of 
foreign (Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP) and internal (Justice and Home Af-
fairs, JHA) security into the framework of the existing communities.
18 While more integra-
tionist countries demanded to retain a unified treaty structure, this idea met the strong opposi-
tion more intergovernmentalist countries as the United Kingdom, France and Denmark 
(Agence Europe 01 June 1991). The main reason for their objection was the fear of a creeping 
communitarization of the newly created intergovernmental policies due to unforeseen legal 
consequences, and the quasi-constitutional character of such a document. The temple model 
that created new areas of intergovernmental cooperation outside the Community and outside 
the existing treaties therefore prevented the new policies from developing too quickly in a 
federal direction (Martial 1992). In return to the concession to agree on a separate treaty on 
European Union that established the “pillar structure” of the Union, integrationist countries 
insisted on the introduction of an “evolutionary clause” into the TEU that was meant to guar-
antee the ultimate integration of the now separate “pillars” into the Community. According to 
Article N ToA, a new IGC should be convened in 1996 in order to review the treaty structure 
as well as the functioning of the intergovernmental policies (Vanhoonacker 1992: 46).
19 Since 
it would for the time being have consolidated the status quo, the Heads of State and Govern-
ment explicitly refrained from conferring a legal personality to the new legal “creature” EU 
alongside that of the ECs. Its legal nature and its exact relationship to the ECs were thus de-
liberately left open and subject to further discussions. In short, with the decision to found a 
new Union outside the Community and its treaties, and to refrain from endowing it with legal 
                                                 
17 (Schroeder 2002, 2003; von Bogdandy and Nettesheim 1996; Wessel 2003) 
18 (Vanhoonacker 1992; Laursen et al. 1992; Wester 1992a, 1992b, 1992c) 
19 “(…) to maintain in full the “acquis communautaire” and built on it with a view to considering, 
through the procedure referred to in Article N (2) [the 1996 IGC, MK], to what extent the policies and 
forms of cooperation introduced by this treaty may need to be revised with the aim of ensuring the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms and institutions of the Community” (Article B). 
  12personality, the Member States opted for a situation of internal and external legal complexity 
that constitutes a compromise between two very different approaches to European integration.  
For lawyers, the conferral of a single legal personality constituted the most conclusive way to 
simplify the existing primary law. Indeed, over the years primary law had turned from an ac-
quis communautaire into what Franklin Dehousse coined the “macquis communautaire” 
(Dehousse 1997)
20 as Member States had in each treaty revision opted to amend the founding 
treaties. They were therefore never legally consolidated and codified into one instrument. The 
legal order consequently spread quite uncoordinatedly over a multiplicity of fundamental 
texts, a large number of legal acts, and in the meantime obsolete legal ruins.
21 This barely 
comprehensible patchwork entailed from a legal point of view a high degree of legal uncer-
tainty. And now it was added a new, legally undefined creature with new legislative proce-
dures as well as opt-outs for certain countries in certain policies. Thus, the already existing 
debate in academia on simplification now involved the basic question of the relation of EU 
and ECs to each other. A real simplification, the argument went, would best be accomplished 
by drawing up a new single treaty that legally succeeded and repealed the patchwork primary 
law (Bieber and Amarelle 2000; Lipsius 1995). Such a treaty would further reorganize the 
Union’s law by identifying common elements of both the ECs and EU, and allow distinguish-
ing between essential and non-essential primary law. The merger of the personalities was re-
garded as the “cherry on the top” in the exercise of simplification as it paved the way to a sin-
gle legal instrument that would repeal the entire primary law and largely facilitate the reor-
ganization of the European constitutional architecture. The result of such a far-reaching sim-
plification exercise would be a legal document with a strong constitutional character.
22 To 
                                                 
20 See (Müller-Graff 2002; De Witte 2002; Obwexer 2004; Schmid 1998, 1999). In addition, the readability of 
primary law had suffered quite a bit because difficult negotiations had resulted in minutious and barely compre-
hensible provisions, whose subtleties, language, and translations were most often only understood by legal ex-
perts. Also, the primary texts did no longer reflect the existing legal practice, since this had more and more been 
refined by the jurisprudence of the ECJ through famous doctrines like supremacy, direct effect, to mention just a 
few. Finally, the treaties entailed a mixture of essential and non-essential provisions all subject to the same revi-
sion procedure. In short, primary law had slowly lost its systematic consistency. 
21 These are among others the three treaties establishing the European Communities, the TEU, the treaties 
amending respectively revising these founding treaties as well as a large number of declarations and protocols 
annexed to them, the accession treaties, and some quasi treaties.  
22 Just like the decision on simplification is necessarily mingled with the question of single legal personality, so 
is the merger of the legal personalities hardly realizable as a stand alone decision as it is often discussed in the 
context of external relations (Bribosia forthcoming). Although a merger of entities is in principle possible 
through an act of international law, it would largely put the existence of separate and unconsolidated versions of 
the treaties into question as such an exercise at first doubles and renders superfluous many provisions in the 
respective treaties. Especially a single legal personality (merger of EU and ECs) would largely aggravate the 
original problem: Because once the entities are merged and one entity supersedes the other, the distinction be-
tween the Union and the Communities cease to apply while the two terms EC and EU nonetheless remain in the 
treaties. Due to a plethora of cross-references in the treaties, an immense legal uncertainty would follow about 
the hierarchy of these provisions and the respective applicable procedures in daily politics. Thus, not only would 
  13sum up, the legal debate regarded legal personality primarily as a means to simplify the trea-
ties in order to achieve greater legal certainty. In political regards, however, every simplifica-
tion exercise would possibly open Pandora’s Box and evoke political debates on the EU’s 
constitutional architecture.  
In other words, its legal intricacies render the question of single legal personality a very com-
plex and technical issue. Yet, as outlined above, its origins and implications are highly politi-
cal. In particular in the context of discussions of substantial treaty reforms, the line between a 
simplification exercise and redrawing the existing institutional balance is only very thin (De 
Witte 2002). Hence, by broaching the issue of simplification and the merger of the entities the 
Member States would return exactly to the point that brought up the complexities in the first 
place: the question of a treaty with a substantial constitutional character. It is therefore not 
surprising that political arguments quickly prompted legal reasoning for and against the single 
legal personality during the 1996-7 IGC. In the highly politicized context of the European 
Convention in 2002-3, in contrast, it was mainly legal reasoning that prevailed in the delibera-
tions, as a quote by one member of the Convention nicely illustrates: 
“At one stage, some of us encouraged him [the chairman Giuliano Amato] to be less bal-
anced and a little more political, but I reconsidered my stance because I think he was 
right. (…) This is not the first time that the question of legal personality for the European 
Union has been raised. Thus far the idea of a single legal personality has not enjoyed 
much success. In order to progress and be successful, it should be demystified and disen-
tangled from the ideological layers involved in this matter.” (Szájer 03 October 2002) 
While this question was tabled and eventually left undecided during the 1996-7 IGC, the sin-
gle legal personality was the very first issue the Conventioneers agreed on in 2002. The far-
reaching and immediate outcome took most Conventioneers and even the chairman of the 
respective Working Group entirely by surprise (Interview Amato, 04 November 2005).
23 The 
                                                                                                                                                         
the rationale for a separate TEU be initially removed. From this point of view the conferral of a single legal 
personality would necessarily need to be accompanied by a far-reaching reorganization of the treaties (Bribosia 
2001).  
 
23 See Klaus Hänsch’ intervention at the Plenary: 
„(…) Wir wissen, dass wir einen noch schwierigen Weg vor uns haben (…) aber mit dem gestern 
vorgelegten Verfassungsentwurf wissen wir, dass da ein Weg ist, den wir gemeinsam gehen können. 
(…) (W)ir werden den Entwurf einer Verfassung für die Europäische Union ausarbeiten. Vor acht 
Monaten war das durchaus noch eine sehr umstrittene Frage. Dass wir uns darauf geeinigt haben, ist 
ein Erfolg der Arbeit, die wir in den vergangenen acht Monaten gemacht haben. (W)ir werden einen 
einheitlichen Vertrag haben, und ich unterstreiche nur einen einheitlichen Vertrag mit einem 
Verfassungsteil und einem operativen Teil. Das ist ein klares Bekenntnis zur Rechtssicherheit und zur 
Kontinuität. Vor acht Monaten lag das alles noch in weiter Ferne. (…) (W)ir werden der Union die 
Rechtspersönlichkeit zuerkennen. Das wird ihr erlauben, nach außen einheitlich vertreten zu sein und 
geschlossen aufzutreten. Vor acht Monaten war das noch außerhalb jeden Konsenses. Dass wir das 
geschafft haben, ist auch ein Erfolg der bisherigen Arbeit. (W)ir lösen die unsinnige und hinderliche 
Pfeilerstruktur der heutigen Verträge auf. Damit wird eine Forderung des Europäischen Parlaments, die 
wir seit Maastricht und Amsterdam immer wieder erhoben haben, erfüllt. (W)ir nähern uns mit dem 
  14primary reason that almost every participant eventually gave for this smooth decision was a 
legal argument that constitutional lawyers had repeatedly advanced for already more than a 
decade, namely the simplification of the EU’s constitutional architecture.  
Outcome of the Amsterdam IGC:  
Compromise  
 
-  Lowest common denominator outcome 
-  Agreement tabled until the end of the Con-
ference 
-  Different reasons for an against the outcome 
Outcome of the Convention: 
Consensus 
 
-  Surprising outcome above the lowest com-
mon denominator 
-  Early Agreement 
-  Same Reasons for the Outcome 
 
 
In other words, IGC and Convention resulted in two very different outcomes. While the IGC 
agreed on a lowest common denominator outcome that basically left the status quo un-
changed, the Convention’s agreement on single legal personality features all signs of a rea-
soned consensus: participants give the same reasons for the decision, the agreement is ob-
tained early in the negotiation process, and it is surprising as exogenous preference changes 
do not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation for these diverse outcomes. These indica-
tors jointly point to endogenous preference changes due to effective arguing. We hypothe-
sized that a higher degree of uncertainty, the transparency of the debate, and leadership in the 
context of the Convention is conducive to the prevalence of arguing. In the following we will 
focus more precisely on the negotiation process that led to the conclusion to the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
The 1996-97 IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam 
To the surprise of political elites, ratification of the ToM was fraught with serious difficulties 
as referenda resulted in a surprisingly low support for the treaty in France (with 51.05% in 
favor) and even its rejection in Denmark. The secrecy of the IGC was regarded as partly re-
sponsible for the debacle as they were “too far away from the citizens” as to be understand-
able for them (McDonagh 1998: 35). In June 1994, the European Council in Corfu therefore 
established a “Reflection Group” that, “in a spirit of democracy and openness” should exam-
ine and elaborate ideas for the revision of the Treaties (European Council 1994a).
24 Under the 
                                                                                                                                                         
Entwurf dem Ziel einen großen Schritt, nämlich der Union eine neue, straffere, einfachere und 
transparentere Grundlage zu geben. Das ist der Auftrag von Laeken, den wir zu erfüllen haben“ (Klaus 
Hänsch, 29.10.2002). 
24 In the run-up to these talks the European institutions issued their reports on the functioning of the treaties, 
which all underlined the necessity of reviewing and simplifying the legal architecture (Jacqué 1997). See (SN 
5082/95); (Report of the Court of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the treaty on European Union, 
  15aegis of the Council’s Jurisconsult Jean-Claude Piris, the General Secretariat prepared a report 
on the simplification of the treaties (SN 513/95), which stressed the necessity of a single legal 
personality and the drafting of a simplified Treaty-Charter.
25 In its final report the Reflection 
Group recommended to include this issue in the IGC agenda
26 The IGC was officially con-
vened in March 1996 at the European Council in Turin. Monthly meetings on the level of for-
eign ministers were prepared by weekly meetings on a working party level. In the light of the 
Reflection Group report, the Heads of State and Government asked the IGC inter alia “to 
consider whether it would be possible to simplify and consolidate the Treaties” (European 
Council 29 March 1996). 
In their position papers to the IGC, some delegations outlined their preferences on the ques-
tion of simplification. The Benelux (Benelux memorandum 7 March 1996), for instance, sup-
ported for simplification with a view to legibility, while Belgium more explicitly put forward 
the idea of recasting the present treaties (Note de politique du gouvernement au parlement 
concernant la Conférence Intergouvernementale de 1996, Octobre 1995). The UK, however, 
voiced its concerns with regard to a far-reaching stance to simplification and came out in fa-
vor of a more modest approach to the simplification exercise: 
“The UK government favours simplifying the Treaty, and proposes the deletion of all its 
obsolete articles. It argues, nonetheless, that many of the proposals for simplification of 
the Treaty raise problems because they could, in some cases, change its substance or alter 
the institutional balance” (UK White Paper of 12 March 1996 on the IGC: “An associa-
tion of nations”). 
In a preliminary report to the IGC (CONF 3831/96) the General Secretariat outlined three 
options: simplification (removing obsolete provisions), consolidation (merging the various 
existing Treaties and Protocols into one legal instrument without necessarily merging the enti-
ties), and reorganization (consolidation and subsequent reorganization of the Treaties, most 
probably on the basis of a single legal personality). The General Secretariat itself recom-
mended the latter approach, and questioned the co-existence of the diverse legal entities since 
this circumstance was deemed “not conducive to public awareness of the European integra-
tion process.” Because a thus simplified version would have to be put subject to ratification 
                                                                                                                                                         
Luxembourg, May 1995). See European Parliament, Resolution of 17 May 1995, paragraphs 2 and 14, European 
Commission Report paragraph 90.  
25 Parts of this report were later published under a Pseudonym (Lipsius 1995). At the same time, and at the re-
quest of the European Parliament, a group of lawyers at the University of Lausanne drafted a simplified version 
of the treaties (Agence Europe 09 November 1995). Later in the process, a group of legal experts at the European 
University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre in Florence, headed by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, had come up with 
a draft treaty that merged as far as possible the existing treaties and thus demonstrated the feasibility of a simpli-
fication and parallel restructuration of the treaties while retaining the existing law.  
26 It identified three challenges the IGC should respond:  “Bringing Europe closer to its citizens”; improving the 
institutions so as to allow the Union to function more effectively in the light of enlargement; and increasing the 
Union’s capacity for external action (Final Report to Madrid Council, 05 December 1995). 
  16again, the report anticipated possible concerns about ratification problems and outlined sev-
eral ways as to ease national ratification. At the Florence summit in June 1996, the European 
Council then asked the incoming Irish Presidency to prepare a “general outline for a draft re-
vision of the Treaties” and called “, and vaguely called on the IGC to seek all possible ways 
of simplifying the Treaties as to make the Union’s goals and operation easier for the public to 
understand” (European Council 1996).  
In the second half of 1996 the debate focused shortly on the implications of a (single) legal 
personality for the EU’s capacity for external action. This question raised concerns in neutrall 
countries and Denmark, in particular as these countries feared a “supranationalization” of the 
CFSP. In a second report to the IGC, the General Secretariat again tried to alleviate those 
fears and explicitly advocated a merger of the entities. It argued that although the EU was not 
explicitly conferred legal personality, it had already developed various procedures as to cir-
cumvent this obstacle, and therefore gained a de facto legal personality alongside the EC. As 
this circumstance constituted a source of confusion to third countries, it was deemed detri-
mental to the coherence of the Union’s external policies (SN 3554/96; CONF 3876/96, CONF 
3871/96). This debate on the impact of a single legal personality on external action brought up 
exactly the same concerns that had already been raised in Maastricht, namely implications for 
the division of competences among the European institutions. Again, the UK government and 
France feared unintended legal consequences for the “pillar structure”. But also the Commis-
sion hesitated: While its Commissioner Oreja favored a single legal personality and a far-
reaching consolidation, parts of the Commission’s legal service feared – in contrast to the UK 
and France – a creeping intergovernmentalization of the community pillar (Interview with 
Giorgio Maganza, 27 January 2006, Interview with Jean-Claude Piris, 02 May 2005). In a 
non-paper (Non-Paper Piris, 16 October), the Jurisconsult Piris again very tried to remove 
those doubts and explicitly argued that neither a fourth legal personality (the conferral of legal 
personality to the EU alongside that of the ECs), nor a single legal personality would have no 
consequences at all for the distribution of competences and, thus, for the “pillar structure”:  
“(…) les critiques formulées méconnaissent le fait que (…) [aucune] conséquences ne peut 
en être tirée quant au nombre, à la nature et à la portée des droits en cause, et encore moins 
quant aux modalités et aux procédures selon lesquelles ces droits pourraient être exercés.  
 (…) la fusion des personnalités juridiques en une seule n’interdirait pas d’octroyer des 
compétences différenciées selon les domaines et de soumettre l’exercice de ces compéten-
ces à des procédures décisionnelles radicalement différentes. 
(…) Dès lors, il n’est pas exact de prétendre que la fusion des personnalités conduirait à 
l’abandon des caractéristiques actuelles des piliers. Il est juridiquement parfaitement possi-
ble d’atteindre les objectifs de clarté et de visibilité externe de l’Union sans y porter at-
teinte. “ (Piris 16 october 1996) 
  17However, despite these clear attempts to remove doubts about unintended legal consequences, 
two big countries, France and GB, showed no signs of giving up their objections. Slowly it 
became apparent, however, that despite these efforts on part of the General Secretariat, neither 
the conferral of a fourth legal personality to the EU alongside the ECs, nor the merger of the 
entities into a single personality would reach unanimity (CONF/3979/96, CONF 3988/96: 8). 
From now on the discussion on simplification would take a lower stance and primarily focus 
on the merger of the treaties and a possible merger of the three European Communities solely. 
In order to guarantee that other simplification exercises that did not require the merger of the 
entities would not be affected by substantial negotiations on the acquis, the Conference estab-
lished a special working group, the “friends of the presidency group on codification-
simplification”. Its task was therefore described “technical in nature” (CONF 4100/1/97 REV 
1).
27 Nonetheless, even the rather technical editing of several simplified treaties, ranging from 
versions of pure editorial surgery (such as renumbering of articles, simplifying wordings, de-
leting obsolete provisions) to versions that merged the treaties,
28 brought up political contro-
versies. The issue of legal personality resurfaced in February when the Secretariat in a Non-
Paper issued a proposal on an article on external action that endowed the EU with a single 
personality (CONF 3829/97). This proposal as well as another attempt by the Dutch Presi-
dency to raise this issue (CONF 3875/97) was primarily rejected by the UK and Denmark 
(Interview with Jean-Paul Jacqué, 25 January 2006). 
A far-reaching simplification on the basis of a single legal personality thus seemed to be out 
of reach. But also the less ambitious proposal to merge the treaties while keeping the legal 
personalities separate met objections. In the end of April, the Dutch Presidency therefore de-
murred that neither a merger of the entities, nor a merger of the treaties was likely to gain 
enough support within the Conference (CONF 3901/97). Yet, since it was a large majority of 
Member States that had supported this exercise, the blockage by the UK and France was not 
considered the final word. The Presidency therefore suggested that 
“this option (merger of the EC and EU Treaties) should be developed further, without 
prejudice to the decision to be taken in the Conference on whether the Union should be as-
cribed legal personality and, if appropriate, whether the legal personalities of the Union and 
the EC should be merged” (CONF 3901/97) 
                                                 
27 It essentially consisted of members of the permanent representations to the EU as well as representatives from 
the Commission. 
28 See CONF 4107/97, CONF 4108/97, CONF 4109/97. In particular a version put forth by the Belgian delega-
tion (CONF 4117/97), and that sought to underline the Community elements within the consolidated treaty, 
aroused new controversy. However, the majority of delegations declared their support for the Belgian approach 
(CONF 4114/07). 
  18However, the opposition on part of France and the UK was insurmountable. Arguments that 
sought to remove doubts about unintended legal consequences from a single legal personality 
were dismissed, and proposals for facilitation of ratification rejected. Both delegations argued 
that  
“(…) even in this case [no unintended consequences, and facilitation of ratification; MK], 
the solution adopted would cause them [the delegations, MK] ratification problems in na-
tional law, in particular by imposing a general reexamination of the Treaties” (CONF 
4151/97) 
Disappointed by the frustration of the unfinished work, and because they feared that this 
would put an end to future efforts of simplification, Portugal, Ireland, and Belgium, decided 
to take a stronger stance on the entire simplification exercise. The UK’s strong support for 
renumbering the articles was suspected to be a deliberate effort to put a stop to all future sim-
plification exercises with the conclusion of this IGC (Schmid 1998). In the end, the IGC 
agreed on the least ambitious simplification option: The Treaty deleted a number of obsolete 
provisions and renumbered the articles.
29  
In sum, the negotiations on legal personality in the context of the Amsterdam IGC were sub-
ject to processes of bargaining. Preferences were not uncertain, but clear and rigid (Hypothe-
sis 1). Thus, negotiating parties were unmistakably divided in two camps: Belgium, backed by 
a majority of Member States, was the main spokesperson for the advocates of a merger of the 
entities, while the UK, backed by France, and Denmark, opposed the conferral of a single 
legal personality to the EU. Their argumentation was not constrained by procedural norms as 
suggested in the hypothesis on transparency (Hypothesis 2). This camp of opponents, how-
ever, advanced several lines of reasoning at the same time. From the outset it was argued that 
the merger of the entities would have unintended legal consequences, for external relations as 
well as for the inter-institutional balance of power in general. All efforts, by the General Se-
cretariat in particular, to dissipate these doubts could not overcome these delegations’ opposi-
tion as they were able to switch from this line of reasoning to next: It was further argued that a 
single legal personality in conjunction with a consolidated treaty would cause ratification 
problems by imposing a general reexamination of the treaties. Both concerns were considered 
stubborn and legally unsubstantiated by the Belgian delegation. The main reason from this 
perspective was deemed to lie in a general intergovernmental stance to European integration: 
                                                 
29 The Conference further agreed on Declaration 42 that asked the General Secretariat to further work on a codi-
fied version of the Treaties, which, however, would have “no legal value” (CONF 4000/97), but a commitment 
to continue the exercise in a group of experts or a new IGC was noticeably absent (Church and Phinnemore 
2001; Schmid 1999). 
  19“Une chose est sure: les réticences soi-disant techniques sont en fait politiques“ (internal pa-
per Belgian Delegation, n.d.) (see also Jacqué 1997). 
 
The European Convention 
Simplification after Amsterdam 
Just like the Treaty of Maastricht the Treaty of Amsterdam contained provisions for its own 
revision. The protocol on the institutions annexed to the ToA stipulated that in the case of 
enlargement entailing the accession of not more than five countries, the Commission “shall 
comprise one national of each Member State, provided that, by that [accession] date, the 
weighting of the votes in the Council has been modified” (ToA). A looming “big bang” 
enlargement by much more than five states then brought up calls for urgent reform. The Co-
logne summit in June 1999 (European Council 1999) thus decided that a further IGC would 
have to be convened in early 2000 in order to take decisions on the so-called Amsterdam-
leftovers: the voting weights in the Council, the composition of the Commission, and the ex-
tension of QMV. Although the Italian delegation put forward that the Conference could give 
instructions to a technical body to submit specific proposals (CONFER 4717/00 LIMITE), the 
simplification and the single legal personality was not put on the IGC agenda. Outside the 
Nice IGC, however, the idea of drawing up a constitutional treaty suddenly gained ground. On 
12 May 2000 the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer gave a speech at the Humboldt-
Universität Berlin where he called for a new foundation of the European Union. Thus, he was 
not so much concerned with the simplification of primary law, but explicitly demanded to go 
far beyond droit constant and to found a lean European Federation that would have to be “es-
tablished a new with a constitution” (Fischer 2000). This speech initially met strong skepti-
cism from other Member States such as the UK, France, and the Portuguese Presidency (Fi-
nancial Times 29 May 2000), and only received support from pro-federalist countries as the 
Benelux countries, Germany, and Italy. What is more, this speech again aroused fears that the 
new simplification rhetoric was simply a disguise for federalist intentions to open a debate on 
the distribution of power among the European institutions, or the EU and the Member States, 
respectively. In a debate on the IGC the House of Commons’ European Scrutiny Committee 
in a meeting in the end of May, for instance, addressed this issue. 
“One essential difficulty is that this proposed re-ordering would give, and is by its advocates 
intended to give, the founding Treaties the form and character of a constitution. (…) Both 
the EC and the EU remain, essentially, international organisations based on Treaties be-
tween sovereign States and their founding documents should reflect that essential character-
istic” (House of Commons 25 May 2000: 152). 
  20Fischer’s speech provoked a wide range of responses, though. In June 2000 the French Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac delivered an address before the German Bundestag in which he objected 
Fischer’s call for a new foundation of the EU on the one hand, but was favorable to address-
ing in the long run questions concerning the EU’s finalité. In November, Blair took up the 
idea and proposed a kind of charter of competences – a statement of principles – that would 
be much simpler and more accessible to European citizens. He made clear, though, that such a 
basic text would not be legally binding, but only possess political character (Blair, Warsaw 
speech). 
In the meantime institutional reforms had been discussed in the IGC, which was concluded in 
the so-called “night of the long knives” at the Nice summit. The negotiations among the 
Heads of State and Government were largely regarded as hostile and even inefficient, and 
their upshot, the Treaty of Nice, was commonly considered a disappointment. Pressures from 
pro-integrationist countries, notably Germany, led to the annexation of the Declaration No. 23 
on the Future of the Union to this treaty. This Declaration encouraged a deeper and wider dis-
cussion on the future of the European Union, whose results should be taken up by a new IGC 
that would make the necessary changes to the treaties. Of particular importance was the dis-
cussion of a delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States, the status of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights, the role of national parliaments in the European architecture, 
and the “simplification of the treaties with a view of making them clearer and better under-
stood without changing their meaning” (Declaration No 23, emphasis added). Thus, the sim-
plification theme and, thus, the question of single legal personality, were put on the EU’s re-
form agenda again. It was doubtful, though, if the Convention would be able to break the 
deadlock of Maastricht and Amsterdam. 
“[A] real “constitution” requires the clarification of basic questions relating to its architec-
ture and the objectives (political or not) of the Union. This is precisely why it is unlikely to 
happen, as the integration process is precisely based on ambiguous compromises (…)” 
(Bribosia 2001: 213). 
On 15 December 2001 the Heads of State and Government therefore agreed on convening the 
“Convention on the Future of Europe” as the forum responsible for preparing the 2004 IGC 
(European Council 2001).
30 The Laeken Declaration set out the institutional provisions and 
                                                 
30 It was composed of four main components: representatives of the national parliaments, the EP, representatives 
of the Member States, and the European Commission. Representatives of the candidate countries, both of the 
national parliaments and the governments, were put on almost equal footing with the Conventioneers, apart the 
fact that they were not allowed to prevent an emerging consensus. The Convention thus comprised 102 members 
plus their alternates plus the three presidents. Chaired by the president Giscard d’Estaing and his two vice presi-
dents Amato and Dehaene, a Praesidium was meant to serve as a steering committee. It was supported by a 
versed Secretariat (headed by the British John Kerr) and represented each of the four components. In contrast to 
the IGCs, all deliberation and documents should be accessible to the public. 
  21the mandate for the Convention. It consisted of more than 60 vague questions, so that in fact 
every issue could possibly become subject to the Convention’s deliberation. Even the Con-
vention’s objective and its final result were left undecided. The mandate stated that its result 
should either be a catalogue of different opinions – among which the IGC would pick their 
favorites – or “recommendations if consensus is achieved”. Shortly after the Laeken Declara-
tion, however, it became more and more obvious that the Convention would at least aim at 
elaborating a single text.  
In sum, the “failure” of Amsterdam put to a stop all attempts to simplify the treaties, and to 
discuss conferring a single legal personality to the EU. In consequence, this issue was did not 
make it on the Nice agenda. Only in the context of the new constitutional debate was the 
question of simplification and legal personality again brought up and put on the new reform 
agenda. Surprisingly, however, the British governments suddenly gave up its objection to the 
term “constitution” if this implied a better comprehensible text in the form of a “statement of 
principles.” But this did not imply an agreement to a single legal personality and the merger 
of the treaties, as the British government representative, Peter Hain, was quick in downplay-
ing the importance of terms (The Guardian 28 February 2002).  
 
The Convention 
In order to set the agenda for the next IGC and, thus, to increase the Convention’s signifi-
cance, the Chairman of the Convention, Giscard D’Estaing decided to aim at drafting a single 
text without loose ends (Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, 26 February 2002). Anticipating quarrels 
about the Convention’s final result he created and further coined a neologism that would ease 
both Skeptics and federalists in the Convention. 
“If we were to reach consensus on this point, we would thus open the way towards a Consti-
tution for Europe. In order to avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to 
call it: a “constitutional treaty for Europe” (Ibid). 
Through this approach the Convention began questioning the “inviolability” of the acquis – 
the Nice Treaty that would soon enter into force – and assumed the same task as an IGC. 
Nonetheless, the question of the actual format of the Convention’s final outcome remained 
unaddressed until the Praesidium established a first wave of Working Groups. This first wave 
primarily addressed questions constitutional issues, namely Subsidiarity (WG I), the Status of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and/or accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (WG II), the Legal Personality of the EU (WG III), and the role of the National Par-
  22liaments (WG IV). Specific policies were left to subsequent discussions in a next wave of 
WG.  
In the beginning of June the WG on Legal personality assumed its work. It was chaired by 
Giuliano Amato, the former Prime Minister of Italy and a constitutional lawyer, who – in that 
position – had already headed a study group on the simplification of the treaties at the RSCAS 
in Florence. The WG comprised 28 Conventioneers, six of the MEPs, 13 MP, 7 representa-
tives of the Member states, one member of the European Commission and one observer. Al-
though discussions were not made public, the transparency of the Convention nevertheless 
also pervaded the proceedings in the WG as “there were always interested people in the room 
that we did not know, but that were not showed the door” (Interview Giuliano Amato, 04 No-
vember 2005). The level of expertise among the Conventioneers was very uneven, with some 
having absolutely no experience with European affairs and others being explicit experts of the 
question of legal personality. Ideological cleavages, however, resurfaced quickly at the begin-
ning of the deliberation. Some Conventioneers from the UK and France were deemed particu-
larly hesitant (Interview Giuliano Amato, 04 November 2005, Interview Ricardo Passos 26 
January 2006, Interview Hervé Bribosia, 04 May 2005). 
The WG’s mandate of the WG was drawn up by the Secretariat. In an introductory part it 
stressed that since the EU in external affairs already acted “as if”, and therefore possessed de 
facto legal personality, the WG would have to consider the consequences of a) making the 
EU’s legal personality explicit, and b) merging the legal personalities of the Union and of the 
EC (CONV 73/002). The document goes on 
“(…) The working group also needs to consider the implications of explicit legal personality 
and merger for the issue of simplification of the treaties. The working group may wish to 
explore the extent to which merger would assist simplification, facilitating either a reduction 
in the number of instruments and procedures and/or fusion of the Treaties.” (Ibid) 
In a working document submitted by the Chairman the interrelation between the merger of the 
entities and the pillar structure was addressed more explicitly. 
“The issue of merging the legal personalities is related to the pillar structure of the Union. 
The reason accounting for this structure created by the Maastricht treaty was to make clear 
that the so-called second and third pillars would be operating according to methods radically 
different from the Community method. If the Union was given legal personality juxtaposed 
to that of the Communities, the pillar structure would be preserved. Conversely, if the legal 
personalities were to be merged, the pillar structure could be at stake.  
(…) These questions were already considered during the IGC 1996. The Treaty of Amster-
dam did not eventually adopt any provision on this matter (…). They should now be care-
fully examined by the working group, which may consider the advantages and the incon-
veniences to endowing the Union with full-fledged and single legal personality. 
(…) Also it should be bear in mind that the question of merging the legal personality of the 
Union with that of the Communities is linked with the merger and simplification of the trea-
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tion of the treaties be substantially facilitated?” (WG III, WD 01) 
The first meeting was held on 18 June and started with a tour de table, in which every Con-
ventioneer revealed his or her opinion to the issues under consideration. This provided the 
chairman and the Secretariat the opportunity to anticipate and prepare for counterarguments 
against a far-reaching simplification (Interview Giuliano Amato, 04 November 2005, Inter-
view Ricardo Passos 26 January 2006, Interview Hervé Bribosia, 04 May 2005). In this ses-
sion it was pointed out even more clearly that a decision on an explicit recognition of a legal 
personality for the Union (single or a fourth legal personality) implied changes of constitu-
tional nature. The group would therefore have to discuss possible effects for current system of 
competences, the pillar structure, the procedures for the conclusion of international agree-
ments and the overall simplification of the treaties (CONV 132/02).  
The next meetings on 26 June and 10 July were held with the participation of the Jurisconsults 
of the Parliament (Gregorio Garzón Clariana), the Council (Jean-Claude Piris), and the Com-
mission (Pieter-Jan Kuijper). All experts were in almost complete agreement and emphasized 
what had been the legal majority opinion for years: that the explicit recognition of the legal 
personality of the Union as well as the merger of the entities were desirable for reasons of 
transparency and efficiency, and furthermore, from a legal point of view, distinct from the 
question of the allocation of competences and the institutional balance. Hence, the merger of 
the personalities would not ipso facto result in the dissolution of the pillar structure. Accord-
ing to participants, Piris’ statement made the difference and constituted a first “turning point” 
(Interview Giuliano Amato, 04 November 2005, Interview Hervé Bribosia, 04 May 2005). 
The General Secretariat’s Jurisconsult, who had fought so vehemently for a Single Legal Per-
sonality in Amsterdam that the government representatives even gave him a T-shirt with the 
caption “THE Single Legal Personality of the EU”, was suddenly listened to. Just as already 
in Amsterdam, Piris pointed out that the EU indeed had already a de facto legal personality on 
the international scene, but it was desirable to recognize it explicitly. Preferably, however, the 
legal personalities would be merged for matters of transparency, visibility, efficiency, legal 
certainty, and because it would facilitate the simplification of the treaties.  
“Un certain nombre de craintes ont été exprimés à l’égard des conséquences que pourrait 
avoir la reconnaissance expresse d’une personnalité juridique à l’Union : 
o  elle risquerait de porter aux compétences de la Communauté et/ou des EM [Etats-
membres] ; (…) 
o  elle mettrait en cause la strucutre en « piliers » actuelle ainsi que « la méthode com-
munautaire », qui serait « radicalement différrente » des méthodes retenues par les ti-
tres V et VI du TUE [provisions on CFSP and polica and judicial cooperation on 
criminal matters ToA] (…) 
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Même dans le cas d’une fusion des personnalités juridiques de l’Union et de la CE, la répar-
tition des compétences et des pouvoirs institutionnels ne s’en trouverait pas affectée et pour-
rait être maintenue à l’identique si on le souhaite. » (Working Group 3, Working Document 
3 : 8-10) 
Among the members of the WG slowly emerged the persuasion that single entity would not 
necessarily entail unintended legal consequences and jeopardize the pillar structure (CONV 
170/02). In a first straw poll within the WG only one member, the French Euroskeptic Abit-
bol, objected (Working Group III, Working Document 10).  
But the WG had not yet explicitly discussed the implications for the form of the treaties and 
the Convention’s final product. In a new hearing of experts on 10 July Professor Jean-Victor 
Louis explicitly stressed the link to the merger of the treaties, which was subsequently taken 
up in a new Working document drawn up by the Secretariat.  
“Once the Community no longer had any separate legal personality, the distinction between 
the Union and the Community would cease to apply. The merger of those two Treaties (and 
even the Euratom Treaty) would be a logical consequence of the merger of the Union and 
the Community and would help simplify the Treaties. It has already been pointed out during 
the proceedings that conferring a single legal personality on the Union would not in itself 
affect the nature of the pillar structure. The same holds true for the merger of the Treaties.” 
(Working Group III, Working Document 6: 2) 
During the break a group of Conventioneers issued a motion that demanded a draft for a Con-
stitutional Treaty as a reference for the Convention’s discussions. The undersigned Conven-
tioneers called for the preparation of a Constitutional Treaty by the European Commission by 
October, which should consist of two parts with fundamental and non-fundamental provision, 
merge the existing treaties and dissolute the pillar concept (European Convention 02-07-10). 
The Praesidium hesitated to augur the WG deliberation and unanimously agreed “that the 
proposal was unacceptable since it would imply that the Convention would shirk its own re-
sponsibilities” (European Convention 02-07-12). Indeed, some members still expressed their 
concerns, and demurred about the abstract legal debates in this WG, as for example the Swede 
Kenneth Kvist:  
“I am prepared to give explicit legal personality to the Union and that this replaces the legal 
personality of the Communities under one condition. This must not affect the intergovern-
mental character of the second and the third “pillars” and must not shift the political balance 
from the Member States to the institutions of the Union. (…) It is stated that, from a “strict 
legal viewpoint”, explicit conferral of legal personality on the Union “per se” doesn’t entail 
any amendment, either to the allocation of competencies between the Union and the Mem-
ber states, or between the Union and the community, or to the pillar structure etc. To some 
extent this though seems to underestimate the problem. The shift from two or (three) differ-
ent personalities to one single personality must in reality give rise to some changes” (Work-
ing Group III, Working Document 7: 2) 
It was also criticized that the draft report did not devote enough space to “explain and justify 
the particular form we wish the merger to take” (Comments of Lord Maclennan of Rogart, 
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in agreement on that matter, with the Secretary-General Sir John Kerr favoring a “chapeau” 
treaty that would identify basic elements of both EC and EU, and the triumvirate favoring a 
all-encompassing single instrument. Shortly after the summer break, an internal Secretariat 
paper that argues in favor of an all-encompassing treaty on the basis of a single legal person-
ality was accidentally sent to all Conventioneers. A single instrument, the argument went, 
“(…) would replace the original treaties and the successive revisions (…) [and] should all 
be subject to a ratification procedure. For that reason, before embarking on that course, we 
should bear in mind the concerns of those who have misgivings about submitting to further 
ratification texts which may already have been accepted. However, given the new context, 
and the importance of the reforms planned, the result of holding a new ratification proce-
dure for the “two-part” package would be to canvass the support of the Member States and 
their citizens for the future European project. It would, moreover, make the treaties easier to 
read in the eyes of European citizens, which is one of the main aims of the Convention” (Ib-
id: 17) 
According to participants, the hearing of another expert, Prof Bruno De Witte, constituted a 
next turning point in the deliberations. De Witte made again clear that if the group was to de-
cide the merge of the entities, the merger of the treaties would be a logical consequence. In 
other words, a single legal personality would necessarily imply drawing up an all-
encompassing treaty that would legally repeal the existing primary law (Working Group III, 
Working Document 27). In consequence, the group also “touched on a sensitive subject, i.e. 
what would happen if a Member State did not ratify the outcome of the IGC which would 
follow the Convention” (CONV 281/02). Shortly after this final hearing, Amato announced an 
emerging broad consensus for the attribution of single legal personality for the EU in Plenary. 
An explanatory note on that regard that was drawn up by the Secretariat lays out the reasons 
for the inclusion of that recommendation 
“Bien qu’il soit concevable de fusionner les personnalités juridiques sans fusionner lesdits 
traités, le groupe a conclu sur ce point que la fusion de ces deux traités constituerait une 
suite logique de la fusion de l’Union et de la Communauté, et contribuerait de la sorte à 
simplifier traités. On a observé à cet égard que, dans la mesure où la Communauté 
n’aurait plus de personnalité juridique propre, la distinction entre un TUE et un TCE 
n’aurait plus de raison d’être, et constituerait une source de complication inutile. » (Wor-
king Group III, Working Document 16) 
In sum, the negotiations on legal personality in the context of the Convention were subject to 
processes of arguing. In comparing the institutional settings, we find that several scope condi-
tions were indeed conducive to that effect. In contrast to the Amsterdam IGC, cleavages were 
not clear and rigid, but cross-cutting and in flux as there were not clearly identifiable camps 
within the WG and the Convention in general (Hypothesis 1). We were able to observe differ-
  26ences between the Praesidium and the Secretariat, and hesitation on part of French, British 
and Swedish national parliamentarians instead of government officials.
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In contrast to the IGC, we do not observe actors switching between different lines of reason-
ing. In Amsterdam, the UK and France brought up several different arguments ranging from 
vague concerns about unintended legal consequences, to more pronounced worries about im-
plications of a single legal personality for external action, to distress about possible ratifica-
tion problems. In this case, however, the UK did never back out of their agreement to the term 
“constitution,” but consistently referred to the advantages of a single legal personality for the 
simplification of the treaties:  
“The report is very convincing on an issue close to my heart: making the European Union 
easier for citizens to understand. The present distinction between the Community and the 
Union confuses most people, both those inside the European Union and those from out-
side who negotiate with us. It seems like complexity for complexity’s sake. (…) I am all 
for getting rid of the confusing complexity associated with the pillars, the Community and 
the Union.” (Peter Hain, 03 October 2002). 
Finally, leadership appears to be particularly conducive to helping arguing prevail in the con-
text of the Convention (Hypothesis 3). While all efforts by the General Secretariat to dissipate 
doubts with regard to unintended legal consequences and ratification problems were doomed 
to failure, exactly the same arguments suddenly found fruitful ground in the Convention. Ac-
cording to the participants, this had less to do with the arguments as such, but rather with the 
problem-solving atmosphere the Chairman had created, and the Conventioneers readiness to 
consider other actors’ validity claims:  
“Mr. President, as a member of the legal personality working group, I would like to thank 
Vice-President Amato for helping us to achieve a balanced result. At one stage, some of 
us encouraged him to be less balanced and a little more political, but I reconsidered my 
stance because I think he was right. My first point is that the whole subject of legal per-
sonality has been demystified. This is not the first time that the question of legal personal-
ity for the European Union has been raised. Thus far the idea of a single legal personality 
has not enjoyed much success. In order to progress and be successful, it should be demys-
tified and disentangled from the ideological layers involved in this matter.” (Szájer 03 
October 2002) 
Other more negative voices identified this atmosphere as the principal reason for this outcome 
too: 
                                                 
31 As for instance this quotation of Kirkhope illustrates: 
“There is (…) one area of the report with which I fundamentally disagree, namely the notion that a 
single legal personality should go hand in hand with an abolition of the pillar structure of the EU. 
(…) This structure actually guarantees that the common foreign and security policy, and justice and 
home affairs, remain matters for intergovernmental negotiation rather than supranational governance. 
It is on the basis of that guarantee that the British people accepted the European Union developments 
in that matters and it is a guarantee on which future British involvement in these areas now stand. 
(…) In fact, I would go so far as to say that the pillar structure could theoretically be extended to new 
policy areas.” (Kirkhope 03 October 2002) 
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que en quelque sorte, à l’essence même de l’Union européenne (…) Hélas, je dois le dire 
devant Monsieur Amato, notre groupe de travail s’est saisi de cette question avec des pin-
cettes pour l’évacuer aussitôt, préférant se réfugier dans le huis-clos sémantique que lui a 
capitonné avec complaisance une procession d’experts-maison. » (Abitbol 03 October 2003) 
Nonetheless, it was acknowledged that this was due to the particular set-up of the Convention 
as this final quote of the then Commissioner Michel Barnier illustrates  
“Monsieur le Président, mon intervention n’est pas vraiment une question, mais plutôt 
une observation en forme d’hommage au travail de Monsieur Amato. En effet, j’ai un 
souvenir, comme d’autres ici, assez précis du temps qui a été consacré, par example avant 
la signature du Traité d’Amsterdam, dans un cercle qui n’était pas celui de la Convention 
et qui était un cercle purement diplomatique de négociations intergouvernementales. Je 
suis simplement amené à constater que c’est probablement une preuve supplémentaire 
qu’il fallait opérer autrement. Ainsi, cette Convention, telle que constituée, est un bon ou-
til. En quatre séances de travail, ce groupe, sous l’autorité de Monsieur Amato, avec la 
présence des gouvernements mais d’autres aussi, a abouti à des propositions, que vient de 
présenter Monsieur Amato, extrêmement claires sur la nécessité, les avantages 
l’emportant sur les inconvénients, de doter l’Union d’une perspective juridique et même 
de fusionner des perspective juridiques. Je voulais juste observer que la méthode de la 
Convention me paraissait la bonne pour maintenir et pour l’avenir » (Michel Barnier, 12 
September) 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we argued that a focus on institutional scope conditions for the effectiveness of 
arguing is imperative for a thorough understanding of negotiation processes and outcomes as 
different institutional factors induce actors to take validity claims into account and change 
their preferences accordingly. At the example of negotiations on simplification and the single 
legal personality of the European Union we demonstrated that the institutional set-up was 
indeed conducive to the prevalence of arguing in that the transparency of the debate in con-
junction with a higher degree of uncertainty and leadership made it particularly effective. 
One caveat is necessary. Even though we were able to compare two settings under quasi-
experimental conditions, and to multiply the number of observations in our case study, our 
results are still hardly generalizable. In a second step we will therefore systematically vary 
some of our institutional factors through “within-case” comparisons. More specifically, we 
will compare the deliberations that led to the agreement on single legal personality with that 
on “Social Europe” – a WG that did not come up with a “reasoned consensus”. 
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